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SYNOPSIS OF REPLY ARGUMENT 
The Park's "Safeco New Quality-Plus" policy homeowners policy with 
Safeco entitled them to the "Direct financial loss you incur" and to be paid "shortly 
following the loss" when their Pocatello home was totally destroyed by the Pocatello 
"Charlotte Fire" on June 28, 2012. CR 266. The value of their total loss was ultimately 
undisputed by Safeco: The Parks' 4858.28 square foot two-level custom home would cost 
$440,195.55 to replace. CR 428-429; David Parks Depo. Ex. 21, pp. 25-26. But Safeco 
paid them $169,000 stating they had to buy or build another home and spend their own 
money first before Safeco would pay anything more. 
On May 31, 2013 the Parks made formal demand for their "Direct financial 
loss" $440, 195.55- pursuant to the "direct financial loss" payment provisions of 
paragraph 5(a)(4)(b) of their policy. That paragraph entitled the Parks to their "direct 
financial loss" subject only to the limits of coverage. CR 444-445; David Parks Depo. Ex. 
27. The $440,195.55 loss amount was the replacement direct cost determined by 
Safeco's own expert, Belfor Property Restoration in Boise. In deposition without 
qualification, Safeco admitted "agreement" with all of "the numbers and computations" 
contained in that Belfor determination. CR 564; Safeco Depo. 89:17-22. 
The District Court granted summary judgment to Safeco, ruling as 
Safeco urged the Parks had to fimd their own loss first before Safeco had to pay 
anything. In so ruling, the District Court totally ignored both the "direct financial loss" 
and "shortly following the loss" Safeco policy language. Safeco's only response on 
appeal is that the Parks never made those arguments below so can not be raised on appeal. 
This Reply Brief shows those issues were raised, briefed, and argued. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDISPUTED 
Safeco's brief does not cite any new law or create any conflict oflaw 
between the parties. The applicable general principles of law are not in dispute. 
Specifically, there is no dispute that on appeal from the grant of a motion for summary 
judgment, the Supreme Court reviews that decision de novo while applying the same 
Rule 56 standards. Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 
660, 662, 115 P.3d 751, 753 (2005). 
Nor does Safeco dispute that Insurance contracts must be construed 
"according to the entirety of its terms" and "the context" in which the terms occur. 1 
Idaho Code §41-1822; Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho 138 Idaho 443, 444, 65 P.3d 
184, 185 (2003). Similarly, it is agreed that "common, non-technical words" are given 
the "meaning applied by laymen in daily usage" as opposed to legal usage; and the Court 
construes insurance contracts in the light most favorable to the insured and in a manner 
which will provide full coverage for the indicated risks rather than to narrow its 
protection." Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 
662-663, 115 P.3d 751 (2005); Weinstein v. Prudential Ins., 149 Idaho 299,320,233 
P.3d 1221, 1242 (2010). 
The proper application of those principles would have avoided this appeal. 
1 All italics and bold herein are added for emphasis unless stated otherwise. 
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REPLY ARGUMENT 
REPLY POINT ONE 
THE PARKS ENTITLEMENT TO THEIR 
"DIRECT FINANCIAL LOSS" WAS THEIR POSITION 
FROM THE OUTSET AND WAS DIRECTLY PRESENTED 
TO THE DISTRICT COURT; THERE WAS NO WAIVER 
Two "Loss Settlement" Payment Options 
The Parks' opening brief pointed out that under the Parks' Safeco policy 
there were two "Loss Settlement" routes for the Parks and that they sought payment of 
their "direct financial loss" under the second of those two routes. Plaintiffs' opening 
brief, Point One, pp. 19-23. 
The District Court totally ignored "direct financial loss" 
In granting summary judgment for Safeco, the District Court totally 
ignored that "direct financial loss" second route under the policy the words "direct 
financial loss" appear nowhere in the Court's Memorandum Decision.2 CR 1054-1072. 
That failing was fundamental, reversible error. It was mandatory for the 
District Court to decide the case "according to the entirety of" the Safeco policy terms" 
2 It is undisputed on this appeal that Safeco's adjuster never advised the Parks nor 
acknowledged their right to recover their "direct financial loss" or to be paid "shortly after the loss". To 
the contrary, it is admitted on appeal that Safeco would pay the Parks only "when the Parks incurred the 
cost" - paid their own loss -- of a new home as the Parks only options were "replacing the dwelling at 
its existing location, build on a new location, or purchase an existing home." Safeco brief, pp. 7, 18, 
20. 
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and "the context" in which the terms occur. Idaho Code §41-1822; Purdy v. Farmers Ins. 
Co. of Idaho 138 Idaho 443, 444, 65 P.3d 184, 185 (2003). 
This is what that "Direct financial loss" recovery route looks like as it 
appears in the Parks' Safeco homeowner's policy: 
(4) You may disregard the replacement cost loss settlement provisions and make claim under 
this policy for loss or damage to buildings on an actual cash value basis but not exceeding 
the smallest of the following amounts: 
. (a) the applicable limit of liability; 
(b) the direct financial loss you incur; or 
(c) our pro rata share of any loss when divided with any other valid and collectible insurance 
applying to the covered property at the time of loss .. 
You may still make claim on a replacement cost basis by notifying us of your intent to do so 
within 180 days after the date of loss. 
Safeco's non-substantive response: "issue not raised below" 
Safeco's brief herein does not substantively challenge the Parks' contract 
rights to pursue that "second route" for recovery of their "direct financial loss." Rather, 
Safeco seeks to avoid dealing substantively with that mandatory issue by contending 
incorrectly that the Parks "waived their argument concerning direct financial loss" 
because "this was not an issue raised below."3 Safeco's brief, Point One, p. 13. 
3 Safeco, thus, essentially admits that the District Court committed reversible error in not 
deciding this case on the basis of all the policy provisions, and especially those that entitled the Parks to 
their "Direct financial loss" and to be paid "shortly following the loss." Safeco suggests this Court 
should nevertheless "uphold the lower court's decision if any alternative legal basis can be found to 
support it." Safeco Brief, p. 13. Safeco does not state what such an "alternative legal basis" would be 
- other than the false contention dealt with herein that those two issue were not raised below. 
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False argument - The Right was Centrally and Repeatedly raised below 
Not true. The right of the Parks to recover their "direct financial loss" was 
a repeated formal demand on Safeco, was (a) centrally in the Parks' Complaint and Jury 
Demand, (b) in the Parks' summary judgment filings, at the very forefront of the first 
summary judgment oral argument on lviay 27, 2014, and (c) was specifically 
acknowledged by the District Court and Safeco defense counsel in that May 27, 2013 
first oral argument. Further, it was ( d) acknowledged in the final oral argument as a 
claim under policy paragraph 5(a)( 4) as "exactly what occurred in this case." Tr. 80:18-
81-4 (2-23-15); CR 444-445, 459-485, Ex. 27, 35. 
Pre-suit "Direct financial loss" Formal Demand on Safeco 
But even before any legal proceedings, the Parks' right to recover their 
"direct financial loss" was directed to Safeco by "formal demand" on Safeco on 
December 26, 2012. This is shown by the record on appeal and was specifically set forth 
in the Parks' opening brief herein. Plaintiffs' opening brief, p. 23; CR 444-445; David 
Parks Depo. Ex. 27; Tr. 21 :22-22:4; Tr. 23:8-9; 24:2-12; Tr. 24:23-24; Tr. 44:5-6, 11 (5-
27-14). 
This letter is formal demand for payment to the Parks ... 
* * * 
Because the Parks are, for purposes of this demand, willing to 
agree with the Belfor Property Restoration determination of 
their "direct financial loss" the issue is detennined between 
Safeco and the Parks and the further "Appraisal" provisions 
of paragraph 7 under Section I do not trigger. 
* * * 
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Specifically, this demand is pursuant to your offered July 31st 
letter provisions referenced above and paragraphs 5( a)(l) and 
S(a)( 4) of Section I requiring payment of "the direct 
financial loss" the Parks have incurred. Payment is due. 
-CR 444-445 
* * * 
"Direct financial loss" demand in Complaint and Jurv Demand 
Further demand under the "direct financial loss" provisions of paragraph 
5(a)(4) was repeated in the Parks' letter to Safeco dated May 31, 20134 and was central to 
the Parks' Complaint and Jury Demand, p. 3, 'l'f14; CR 15. 
14. Subject to the Parks' right to determine otherwise, the 
$440,195.55 determination by Belfor Property Restoration 
constituted the "Direct financial loss" of the Parks of their 
totally-destroyed residence. 
- CR 15; Complaint and Jury Demand, ,r 14 
"Direct financial loss" in Answer to Safeco's Discovery 
Following the initial May 31, 2013 "formal demand" for payment to the 
Parks of their "direct financial loss" suit was filed and Safeco sent discovery to the 
Parks'. The Parks policy right to recover their "direct financial loss" was also three times 
spelled-out in their discovery responses: 
• Answer to Safeco's Interrogatory No. 6 on November 22, 2013, Ex. 40 
4 The right of the Parks to recover "direct financial loss" was repeated in a letter to Safeco on 
January 23, 2013 referencing the Parks' direct financial loss as their "actual loss": 
The Parks will bring to me tomorrow the Idaho Falls home sale documents. Copies will 
be sent with the understanding that they are tendered solely to confirm the move 
referenced in my prior letter; their "actual loss" remains the $440,195.55 gross sum as 
determined by Safeco' s retained expert, Bel for Property Restoration of Boise, Idaho 
acknowledged in your November 241h letter as having "been approved" by Safeco. 
- CR 449, David Parks Depo, Ex. 30 
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to David Parks' Deposition, CR 496. 
• Answer to Safeco's Request for Admission No. 21 on September 3, 
2013, and 
• Answer to Safeco's Request for Admission No. 40 on October 22, 2013. 5 
"Direct financial loss" in Summary Judgment Oral Argument 
Consistently, on May 27, 2014 the Parks right to recover their "direct 
financial loss" was argued and literally pointed out by "an arrow" pointing to paragraph 
5(a)( 4)(b) on page 12 of the policy, (CR 284, POL 28). This took place initially in the 
first few minutes of oral argument6 and was followed by multiple references from both 
counsel and the Court. Tr. 21 :22-22:4. 
The District Court Acknowledges "Direct Financial Loss" Right 
Specifically, the right of the Parks to recover their "direct financial loss" 
was argued and pointed out an additional two times to the District Court in that first 
hearing. Tr. 23:8-9; 24:2-12. The District Court specifically acknowledged the "direct 
financial loss" focused position of the Parks and referenced paragraph 4(b) of the policy 
where that recovery right is contained: 
5 The key pages of the Parks' Answers to Safeco's Requests for Admission nos. 21 and 40 are 
attached at the end of this Reply Brief. 
6 MR. HAWKES: And they never requested it. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HAWKES: So now in last page is where we are here. And I've got an arrow at 
the bottom part that basically [points] to where these two were merged together, it boils 
down to you can go after the applicable limit of liability or the direct financial loss or a 
prorata share of the policies. 
THE COURT: Right. Tr. 21:22-22:5 (5-27-14) 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF - Page 11 
David & Kristina Parks v. Safeco Insurance Company of lllinois 
THE COURT: Well, it's listed under 4(b), the direct 
financial loss you incurred. - Tr. 24:23-24 (5-27-14) 
Safeco Counsel acknowledges "direct financial loss" right 
Following the foregoing referenced recognition by the District Court of 
paragraph 5( a)( 4 )(b ), Safeco counsel7 twice acknowledged "direct financial loss" as the 
argument made. Tr. 44:5-6, 11 (5-27-14). 
"Direct financial loss" - Admitted to be what the Parks incurred 
Further, Safeco counsel admitted in oral argument that the Parks' "direct 
financial loss" was not the same as the purchase of another house in Idaho Falls but was 
what they actually incurred: 
THE COURT: Are you saying that that paragraph is the 
paragraph that applies if they go out and buy another house in 
Idaho Falls? And if that's less than the direct financial loss 
even if Mr. Hawkes is correct, the detect [direct] financial 
loss is the amount this they've, quote, unquote, incurred. 
Is that your position? 
MR. SEBASTIAN: Your Honor, yes. 
- Tr. 44:17-21 (5-27-13) 
"Direct financial loss" Demand Admitted to be "Exactly what occurred" 
The Parks seeking payment of their "Direct financial loss" under paragraph 
5(a)(4) of the Safeco policy that was originally fonnalized in the May 31, 2013 demand 
on Safeco was admitted by Safeco counsel in the second and final summary judgment 
7 The same counsel for Safeco argued at the two summary judgment hearings as authored 
Safeco's brief on this appeal. That is why it is curious to now contend "direct financial loss" sought by 
the Parks "was was not an issue raised below." Safeco's brief, Point One, p. 13. 
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oral argument as "exactly what occurred in this case." Tr. 81:3-4 (2-23-15).8 
Summary Judgment Filings 
It was perfectly to be expected that the Parks' right to recover their "Direct 
financial loss" would be centrally presented below given the issue being a central 
demand on Safeco, being focused in discovery, and a part of the Parks' summary 
judgment filings. It was centrally set forth in the Parks summary judgment filing of the 
Declaration of Charles M Miller, paragraphs 16 and 17. CR 944, ,r,r 16, 17. 
* * * 
No Waiver of the Right to Recover "Direct Financial Loss" 
Because the issue of "Direct financial loss" was thoroughly raised with 
Safeco pre-suit and in the totality of the District Court legal proceedings, there was no 
waiver of the Parks; "Direct financial loss" recovery right as Safeco groundlessly argues. 
Safeco's brief, Point One, p. 13. 
Otherwise, the principles of a waiver are well known: Waiver is "the 
relinquishment of a known right" that can only follow a"clear intent to waive" that 
cannot be inferred- and that absolutely did not occur herein. Pocatello Hospita/T LLC 
v. Quail Ridge Medical lnvestorT LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 330 P.3d 1067 (2014) (citing 
Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 457, 259 P.3d 595, 603 (2011); Margaret 
8 That admission of Safeco counsel in that last of two final summary judgment oral arguments 
on February 23, 2015 shows a continuous thread of multiple references and argument of the Parks 
"Direct financial loss" rights under paragraph 5(a)(4)(b) of the Safeco policy. Prior references follow. 
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H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 256, 846 P.2d 904, 907 (1993) and others). 
Silence is insufficient to establish waiver of a right. Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 
20, 824, 136 P.3d 291, 295 (2006). 
Further, for Safeco herein, to assert waiver it must also (I) "show that he 
[Safeco] acted in reasonable reliance upon [the waiver] and" that (2) Safeco "altered" its 
"position" to its "detriment." Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 457, 259 
P.3d 595, 603 (2011). None of that happened; Safeco does not argue in its brief that it 
ever relied upon any waiver by the Parks of their clear assertion of the right to recover 
their "direct financial loss." It could not have; that never happened. 
REPLY POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING 
THE POLICY CONTEXT OF THE WORDS 
"AS DETERMINED SHORTLY FOLLOWING THE LOSS" 
The Parks opening brief pointed out that it was the duty of the District 
Court to consider all of the insurance policy language without discarding any words in 
the context of the policy. Parks opening brief, Point Four; North Pac. Ins. Co. v. Mai, 
130 Idaho 251,939 P.2d 570 (1997); Purdy v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho 138 Idaho 443, 
444, 65 P.3d 184,185 (2003); Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance, 
149 Idaho 299, 315,, 233 P.3d 1221, 1237 (2010). 
Specifically, Point Four explained that while it was reversible error to 
totally ignore the Parks' right to recover their "Direct financial loss" under the second 
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route the Safeco policy provided, it committed reversible error in also totally ignoring the 
words "as determined shortly following the loss" in holding that the Parks had to borrow 
money to pay their own loss before Safeco had any payment obligation. Parks opening 
brief, Point Four, pp. 38-41. 
"Not raised below" -Really?? 
Safeco's only response to Point Four and the District Court's totally 
ignoring the policy payment language of "as determined shortly following the Loss" was 
again - "not raised below and has been waived." Safeco brief, Point E, p. 19. 
Rerun. That is, again, a misrepresentation to this Court just as it was as explained in the 
foregoing Reply Point One dealing with the right to be paid the "Direct financial loss." 
The importance of the language "as determined shortly following the Loss" 
explains the essence of "replacement cost" to insureds who buy a Safeco homeowners 
policy like the Parks had. Payment of a casualty loss "shortly following the Loss" is the 
very essence of why people buy insurance; Insureds expect insurance, not a brick wall of 
assertions that they have to first borrow money to pay their own loss before Safeco 
honors its obligations in selling the insurance. 
This is the "first route" exclusive payment language in the Safeco policy as 
it appears in the policy that the District Court considered in deciding against the Parks: 
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Fully addressed in Oral argument 
Contrary to Safeco's brief's representations to this Court, the "shortly 
5. Loss Settlement. Covered property losses are settled as follows: 
a. Replacemeni Cost Property under Coverage A or Bat replacement cost1 not including those items 
listed in 5.b.(2) and (3) below subject to the following: 
(1} We will pay the full cost of repair or replacement, but not exceeding the smallest of the following 
a.mounts: · 
(a) the llmlt of liabllity under the policy applying to Coverage A or B; 
{b) the replacement costof that part of the damaged building for equivalent construction and 
use on the same premises as determined shortly following the loss; 
(c) the full amount actually and necessarily incurred to repairor replace the damaged building 
as determined shortly following the loss; 
(d) the direct financial loss you incur; or 
{e) our pro rata share of any loss when diVlded with any other valid and collectible insurance 
applying to the covered property at the time of loss. 
(2) When more than one layer of siding or roofing exists for Building Property We Cover, we wm 
pay for the replacement of one layer only. The layer to be replaced w!II be at your option. The 
payment wlll be subject to air other po!ioy conditions relating to loss payment. 
When more than one layer offinished flooring exists we will pay for the finish of only one layer. 
(3) lfthe costto repair orreplace is $1,000 or more, we will pay the difference between actual cash 
value and replacement cost only when the damaged or destroyed property is repaired or 
replaced. 
following the loss" argument was specifically made and briefed to the District Court 
while pointing out the law that in interpreting an insurance policy "you don't throw away 
words": 9 
MR. HAWKES: The definition doesn't say anything about 
any of the arguments that SAFECO can make. They're [the 
9 The necessity of including the words "as determined shortly following the loss" in a correct 
and reasonable application of the word "incurred" with reference to the replacement cost and loss 
incurred was specifically raised below in Plaintiffs' Memo Opposing Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Supporting Summary Judgment for Plaintiffs as Points One and Three. CR 929, 933-934. 
It was also covered in the Declaration of Charles M Miller in Support of Plaintiffs. CR 943, 'ff 14. 
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Parks] entitled to the full amount...- as determined shortly 
following the loss. Tr. 85:22-25 (2-23-15) 
* * * 
THE COURT: ... your argument is actually and necessarily 
means if the house burns out [down], you have an actual 
loss. And as a result - it's been incurred, so you get to pay 
it. 
Tr. 86:4-6 (2-23-15) 
* * * 
MR. HAWKES: Yes. And if you buy a replacement cost 
policy as opposed to an indemnity policy, like their policy 
manual talks about, you've got to look at this whole thing 
under the heading of replacement costs. And you don't throw 
away words. And when you have the words in there as 
determined shortly following the loss, it only makes sense 
that you determine what it was that they lost by their 
replacement cost definition, and you pay it. You don't wait. 
- Tr. 87:6-14 (2-23-15) 
The District Court erred in (1) concluding that the cheaper Idaho Falls 
home the Parks had to borrow money to purchase was "the equivalent of' the home the 
Parks lost, and (2) in ruling that the words "incur" or "incurred" could only have a single 
meaning of incurring indebtedness. The Parks had no policy obligation to borrow money 
and buy another home before being paid for "the loss you incur" - and "as determined 
shortly following the loss" as the policy required. 
Had the District Court properly applied the law and the facts the "direct 
financial loss" of the Parks would have been the same result and recover under either this 
first available route or the primary paragraph 5(a)(4)(b) initial demand on Safeco. 
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REPLY POINT THREE 
BECAUSE THE PARKS' FULL HOME REPLACEMENT COST 
LOSS WAS KNOWN BY THE BELFOR DETERMINATION, 
WE/NSTE/NREQUIRED SAFECO TO PAY THE PARKS 
"AS DETERMINED SHORTLY FOLLOWING THE LOSS" 
Both the Parks and Safeco cite to Weinstein v. Prudential Property and 
Casualty Insurance, 149 Idaho 299,233 P.3d 1221 (2010) in their briefs. The Parks for 
the rule of law that an insurance policy must be interpreted according to the entirety of 
"the context in which it occurs" that the District Court did not do. IO Safeco cites 
Weinstein for the rule of law that, 
where an insurer was able to determine a portion of an 
insured's damages that were justly due under the Policy, the 
insurer was obligated to make payment even if the claim was 
not fully adjusted. 
- Safeco's Brief, page 22. 
In the District Court, the Parks were essentially precluded from challenging 
the Jones appraisal as what they were entitled to. That was wrong and it is a double 
standard for Safeco on this appeal to hold out that Jones appraisal as an act of good faith 
under Weinstein while precluding the Parks from a factual challenge to that appraisal. 
An Insurer's "Assumed Duty" must not be Negligent 
To the extent that Safeco now relies on Weinstein as establishing a duty 
Safeco did not otherwise have, the doctrine of "assumed duty" comes into play. In 
IO Plaintiffs opening brief, pages 18, 40-41. 
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Featherston v. Allstate Insurance Co., 125 Idaho 840, 875 P.2d 937 (1994) this Court 
reversed a summary judgment in favor of the insurer for liability in negligently 
undertaking an assumed duty: 
An insurance policy is a contract and the parties' rights and 
remedies are primarily established within the four comers of 
the policy. State v. Continental Casualty Co., 121 Idaho 938, 
939-40, 829 P.2d 528, 529-30 (1992); Kootenai County v. 
Western Casualty & Surety Co., 113 Idaho 908, 910, 750 P.2d 
87, 89 (1988). * * *This court has recognized a "special 
relationship between insurer and insured which requires that 
the parties deal with each other fairly, honestly, and in good 
faith" and acknowledges the disparity in bargaining power 
between the insurer and insured. White v. Unigard, 112 Idaho 
94, 99, 730 P.2d 1014, 1019 (1986), quoting McCarthay, 
Punitive Damages in Bad Faith Cases 3d 23 (1983 ). In 
addition, it is possible to create a duty where one 
previously did not exist. If one, voluntarily undertakes to 
perform an act, having no prior duty to do so, the duty 
arises to perform the act in a non-negligent manner. 
Bowling v. Jack B. Parson Cos., 117 Idaho 1030, 1032, 793 
P,2d 703, 705 (1990)." 
Featherston v. Allstate Insurance Co., 125 Idaho 840, 843, 875 P.2d 
937, 941 (1994) 
Where Safeco's adjuster admitted the Jones appraisal did not conform to 
what she had specifically requested and that it was thus deficient, it was error for Safeco 
in summary judgment to argue that the Parks were bound by that defective appraisal. And 
it was reversible error for the District Court to deprive the Parks of their right to challenge 
that appraisal where it was held out as the only way they could prove their "direct 
financial loss." 
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Parallels with Weinstein 
This case has strong direct parallels to Weinstein. In both cases the value of 
the insured losses were known. In both cases payment was refused and delayed for 
reasons not required by the policy. In can be shown in a table this way: 
I Weinstein Facts I Parks Facts I 
Plaintiffs medical bills were known. The Parks home replacement cost was 
149 Idaho at 319, 233 P.3d at 1241 known by the Belfor Property Restoration 
evaluation. CR 691-708; Belfor Appraisal 
Liberty Mutual refused to pay those Safeco refused to pay the home 
known and undisputed medical bills - replacement cost though it admitted every 
"he knew Liberty Mutual owed the single element of the replacement cost of 
Weinsteins" under the policy. the Parks home as set forth by Belfor. CR 
149 Idaho at 319, 233 P.3d at 1241 564, 705; Safeco Depo. 89: 17 -22, Ex. 8 
Liberty Mutual had liability for Safeco refused/delayed payment to the 
delaying/withholding payment until the Parks of the undisputed replacement cost 
whole claim was adjusted when such was of their destroyed home as their 
not a policy condition. undisputed "direct financial loss" by 
149 Idaho at 314, 319, 233 P.3d at 1236, requiring them to borrow money to buy 
1241 another home not a policy condition 
under paragraph 5(a)(4)(b) of the policy. 
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REPLY POINT FOUR 
THE $255,000 IDAHO FALLS HOME WAS NOT 
"THE EQUIVALENT Of" THE PARKS 
TOTALLY DESTROYED HOME 
THAT WOULD TAKE $440,195.55 TO "REPLACE" 
The Parks opening brief pointed out that it was error for the District Court 
to recognize and cite several definitions of "replacement" that recognized the meaning to 
be "the equivalent of' only to totally disregard that "equivalent of' definition language in 
holding that the smaller Idaho Falls house the Parks purchased was the "replacement" of 
their much larger home. Parks opening brief, Point Two, pp. 24-28. 
Safeco's brief does not address that "equivalent of' Point Two other than to 
say "The Idaho Falls home replaced the Pocatello structure." Safeco brief, p. 17. That 
misses and avoids the point; one thing can "replace" another and not be "the equivalent" 
of what it replaced. 
It was error by the District Court to disregard that "equivalent of' 
definitional language because insurance contracts, as contracts of adhesion, must be read 
in a light most favorable to the insured and in a manner which will provide full coverage 
for the indicated risks rather than to narrow its protection." Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. 
Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 662-663, 115 P.3d 751 (2005). 
The District Court started the process properly when it focused on the 
definitions of "replace" as found in Webster's Dictionary: 
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I. To place again; to restore to a former place, position, condition, or 
the like. 
2. To refund; to repay; to restore. 
3. To supply or substitute an equivalent/or. 
4. To take the place of; to supply the want of. 
5. To put in a new or different place. 
-CR 1063; Memorandum Decision, p. 10 (4-23-15) 
Six times reference to the "Equivalent" of what the Parks Lost 
On the next half a page of his Memorandum Decision, the District Court 
referred five times to the Parks being entitled to "an equivalent for" what they lost, while 
stating that the five enumerated definitions by Webster's of "replace" were "not in 
conflict with one another." CR 1064; Memorandum Decision, p. 11 (4-23-15). The 
Court then, for the sixth time, stated that the Parks were entitled to the "equivalent" of 
what they lost: 
Within the context of the Replacement Cost provision, all 
interpretations of "replace" as used in the Policy plainly 
provide that Defendant has three options to "supply or 
substitute an equivalent for" Plaintiffs' destroyed home. 
CR 1064; Memorandum Decision, p. 11 (4-23-15) 
The District Court then essentially ignored the very definitional "equivalent 
of' process it had gone through stating that the $255,000 the Parks paid for the Idaho 
Falls home was "the amount actually incurred to repair or replace" the Parks' Pocatello 
home. CR 1066; Memorandum Decision, p. 13 (4-23-15). 
The District Court: "a like-kind analysis" 
That failure of the District Court to apply the "equivalent of' definition is 
further significant because in oral argument the District Court acknowledged that what 
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the Parks were entitled to was "a like-kind analysis" for their home, not a smaller, cheaper 
home. Tr. 24:1 (5-27-14). 
"As-close-as-possible replica of your home" 
That acknowledged "like-kind" and "equivalent for" valuation of the Parks 
loss is also the same "labe1" 11 Safeco put on the Parks policy. The policy spoke of 
providing coverage so that "in the event of a loss" they would be insured for "as-close-as-
possib le-replica" of their home - not a smaller one they had to buy because Safeco, post-
loss would first require them to borrow to get another smaller home. CR 627, POL 49 
A Smaller, less expensive home is not the "Equivalent" 
While it is true that the cheaper Idaho Falls home "took the place of' where 
the Parks now slept at night just as a hotel room or a cheap apartment would have it 
certainly was not the "equivalent for" or "the like-kind" of the Pocatello home the Parks 
lost in the fire. Nor did the cheaper Idaho Falls house purchase "restore to" the Parks the 
"equivalent of' the larger, more expensive Pocatello home for which they had paid their 
decades of premiums to Safeco. 
The District Court erred in not applying the clear law that construes 
insurance contracts in a light most favorable to the insured and in a manner which will 
provide full coverage for the indicated risks rather than to narrow its protection." 
Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 662-663, 115 
11 This page of the Safeco policy is titled Let's make sure you're "fully insured." CR 627, POL 49 
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P.3d 751 (2005). The burden is on the insurer to use clear and precise language if it 
wishes to restrict the scope of coverage; exclusions or provisions not stated with 
specificity will not be presumed or inferred. Clark v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 
138 Idaho 538, 541, 66 P.3d 242, 245 (2003). 
The District Court failed to follow the law in only looking at one portion of 
the Safeco policy and requiring the Parks to first "pay their own loss" before receiving 
any insurance payment. That was reversible error. 
REPLY POINT FIVE 
IT WAS ERROR TO FAIL TO APPLY A DEFINITION 
OF "INCUR" THAT WAS MORE REASONABLE AND 
MORE FAVORABLE TO THE INSUREDS 
The Parks' opening brief explained that it was error for the District Court 
to apply a definition of the word "incur" to only mean incurring a debt - to first "pay 
their own loss" - in connection with the Parks eventual purchase of the smaller, cheaper 
home in Idaho Falls. Parks' opening brief, "Point Three," pp. 28-38. 
The Parks' opening brief pointed out that the word "incur" also had the 
meaning of"incurring a loss" - it was in the focal paragraph 5(a)(4)(b) policy language 
of the "direct financial loss you incur" which the District Court specifically 
acknowledged: 
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The Court: Well, it's listed under 4(b ), the direct financial 12 
loss you incurred. 
Hearing Transcript 24:23-24 (5-27-14); Parks' opening brief, p. 31 
In contrast to the District Court's position that "incur" could only refer to 
incurring a debt, the Parks opening brief pointed out that incurring a loss was also an 
equally-applicable usage as in: 
• The Safeco policy paragraphs 5(a)(l)(d) and 5(a)(4)(b)- "the direct 
financial loss you incur." CR 284, POL 28 
• Mr. Parks' layman's understanding that the word "incurred" to him 
h "" •,13 meant t at 1t occurs.' CR 225; David Parks Depo 83:13-15. 
• This Court's judicial recognition that a loss may even be "incurred" 
before it is even manifest because the casualty event has already taken 
place. CR 950, 411 27; Sundquist v. Precision Steel & Gypsum, Inc., 141 
Idaho 450, 455-56, 111 P.3d 135, 140-41 (2005) 
• Pursuant to "insurance industry standards" the word "incur" should be 
read to include casualty losses for which damage determinations have been 
made and not just a subsequent debt as the District Court so limited usage. 
- CR 943; Charles M. Miller Declaration, 41114 
• Other Idaho law logically recognizing the common use of the words 
"incur" or "incurred" to describe casualty and iryury events, such as where 
persons "incurred physical impairment" or "might incur" from another's 
negligence, or "for any iryury that one may incur" in voluntary 
employment. - Parks opening brief, "Point Three," pp. 36-37; Nitkey v. 
Bunker Hill & Sullivan Min. & Concentrating Co., 73 Idaho 294, 296, 251 
P.2d 216, 217 (1952); Morrison v. Northwest Nazarene University, 152 
12 This portion from the transcript of the May 27, 2014 summary judgment oral argument was 
quoted at length in the Parks' opening brief on this appeal. Yet Safeco's brief nevertheless argued to this 
court that the Parks' "direct financial loss" was "not an issue raised below." Safeco brief, page 13. 
13 Mr. Parks was right. Both "incur" and "occur" have the same Latin root and are synonyms. 
Oxford English Dictionary, www.oed.com/view/Entry/94140 cf www.oed.com/view/Entry/ 130192. 
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Idaho 660, 661, 273 P.3d 1253, 1254 (2012); Idaho Attorney General 
Opinion 78-17 (3-28-78), 1978 WL 22946 
The District Court, even in looking to the 2014 Black's Law Dictionary 
definition of "incur" overlooked the two-part definition that included an involuntary event 
- "to suffer OR" the contrasting and voluntary "bring on oneself ( a liability or expense)" 
while stating the "term incur is not subject to conflicting interpretations."14 CR 1065; 
Memorandum Decision, p. 12 (4-23-15). 
Again, Safeco's brief does not even substantively address of the Parks' 
opening brief "Point Three" or the District Court's one-sided definitional use of the words 
"incur" or "incurred." Rather, it states a terse 14-line response to "Point Three" by the 
conclusion that the Parks "had a choice to rebuild the Autumn Lane home or purchase a 
replace[sic] property. They chose the latter." Safeco brief, p. 18. 
That is not a substantive response; it is a parroting of Safeco' s false 
information to the Parks that such was their only option under the policy that gave them 
the right to recover their "direct financial loss" and to do so "shortly following the loss." 
CR 284, POL 28, 1]',r 5(a)(4)(b) and 5(a)(1)(b). 
At a minimum, the word "incur" has both a volunta,y and an involuntary 
14 It was not necessary to brand the issue as one of "conflicting interpretations" as the words 
"incur" or "incurred" can apply to both an involuntary casualty loss like occurred her as well as a 
voluntary debt incurred that people do for a variety of reasons. A loss incurred would certainly be the 
more common usage where the purchase of casualty insurance is involved. 
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meaning and whether treated as the proper application to the circumstances, an ambiguity, 
or the application of a definition favorable to the Parks and one unfavorable, the usage 
favorable to the Parks must be used. Clark v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 138 
Idaho 538, 541, 66 P.3d 242 (2003). The District Court erred in not so doing. 
REPLY POINT SIX 
THE PARKS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO HIRE ANOTHER 
APPRAISER TO COUNTER THE LOWBALL JONES APPRAISAL 
The Parks' opening brief set forth the detail behind the "Lowball" Jones 
appraisal of the Parks' destroyed home: it was "less than half' what Safeco had advised 
the Parks six weeks earlier it should be insured for ( CR 399.400; David Parks Depo. Ex. 
20, p. 2, Check No. 8004530 (7-26-12), only valuing 1,943 square feet less than half 
of the home's actual 4,858.28 total square footage. CR 705; Safeco Depo. Ex. 8, p. 25 
"Grand Total Areas"; CR 554-555; Safeco Depo. 49:23-50:3; used two-year old 20 I 0 
"comparables" rather than 2012 values and took those "comparables" from three of six 
other "tract" houses rather than the more exclusive area of Autumn Lane where the Parks 
lived. CR 673; Safeco Depo. Ex. 7. 
Admission by Safeco: Jones Appraisal Deficient 
Safeco admitted that was wrong; Mrs. Abendschein testified she had asked 
Mr. Jones to give Safeco "current 2012 values" of the Parks' home "the day before the 
fire" and not 2010 values that Jones used. But Safeco was silently content with receiving 
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that insurer-highly-favorable appraisaL CR 563; Safeco Depo 85:13-19; CR 563; Safeco 
Depo. 85:13-19; Parks opening brief, pp. 10-11. 
Thus, that lowball-defective-negligent Jones appraisal was indefensible 
before the District Court as it failed to meet the non-negligent standard of good faith and 
fair dealing with the Parks. Safeco's fiduciary duty 15 to the Parks certainly included not 
hiding the truth from them and misleading them as to their policy payment rights. 
Collateral Attack on Indefensible Jones Appraisal 
Because the Jones appraisal is substantively not defensible, Safeco's brief 
takes a collateral attack on the Parks, arguing the Parks had a duty to get their own 
counter appraisal or be stuck with that Jones deficient appraisal. Safeco brief, pp. 4, 17 
(The Parks "never obtained a different estimate" and thus had no "grounds to argue with 
the appraisal"; the Parks "failed to provide expert evidence from an appraiser showing 
that Mr. Jones' valuation of the ACV was incorrect."). 
No Second-Appraisal written Demand by Safeco 
But there was zero obligation on the Parks to seek a separate, second 
appraisal. A second counter-appraisal comes into play only "on the written demand of 
either" which Safeco never16 made. This is that contract clause: 
15 "The insured-insurer relationship is one characterized by elements of public interest, adhesion 
andflduciary responsibility." White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 99, 730 P.2d 1014 
(1986) 
16 It is a common feature of an insurance policy for a procedure or process to be optional as 
between the Insureds and the Insurer. For example, in the Parks' Safeco Policy there is a section titled 
"3. An Insured's Duties After Loss." Subparagraph "g" of that paragraph 3 provides that a "signed 
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7. Appraisal. If you and we do not agree on the amount of 
the loss, including the amount of actual cash value or 
replacement cost, then, on the written demand of either, ... 
- CR 284, 330; Safeco policy, page 12 at the bottom ("on 
the written demand of either" is added as bold and italics 
for emphasis). 
"Replacement Cost" is the Insured's Standard 
Further, it is significant as to the Parks right to recover their "Direct 
financial loss" under their "Replacement Cost" policy that the "Insured's Duties After 
Loss" provisions of the Parks' Safeco policy focus solely upon "Replacement Cost." The 
Parks' obligation was to provide Safeco information "of the loss to the building and 
damaged personal property showing in detail the quantity, description, Replacement Cost, 
and age; not a depreciated value. 17 CR 616, Safeco policy, Section I "Property 
Conditions" 411 3(e), POL 27. 
No Proof Limitations 
Thus, it cannot be disputed in good faith; the Safeco policy does not require 
the Parks to retain any appraiser to prove their loss. Nor is there anything in the policy 
that limits how the Parks can prove their "direct financial loss." The admitted-deficient 
sworn proof of loss" is only required "within 60 days after we request" such. CR 283, 329; POL 27. 
In the May 27, 2014 first summary judgment hearing it was pointed out to the District Court that 
Safeco had taken a position that the Parks "never provided a proof of claim" but that "the policy doesn't 
require [a] proof of claim ... unless they [Safeco] request it ... And they never requested it." Tr. 21 :15-23; 
POL 27. That makes practical sense as typically, like here, there is great detail in the Insurer's file from 
what the insured has furnished infonnally by phone, letter, visits with the onsite adjuster, public 
information from governmental agencies and such. 
17 
"Replacement Cost" in the Safeco policy is defined as "the cost, at the time of loss, to repair 
or replace the damaged property with new materials of like kind and quality, without deduction for 
depreciation" - there is no reference to appraisal. CR 623, POL 41; CR 942, Miller Declaration, 'IT 12 
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Jones appraisal was assailable in the ways that "expert" testimony is always subject to 
challenge: (a) Internal errors, contradictions, and inconsistencies; (b) incorrect facts and 
computation elements; ( c) failure to apply material components in final computations; 
and, among others, ( d) Admission by the party/Safeco that the appraisal failed to follow 
directions and poiicy requirement. The Jones appraisai was subject to all these defects. 
At a minimum, those admitted failings and defects created questions of fact 
that precluded the District Court from accepting it as "the final word" on the value of the 
Parks' home immediately prior to the fire loss. 
It was reversible error for the District Court to deprive the Parks of their 
factual right of proving their "Direct financial loss"proof by the stipulated accurate Bel for 
Property Restoration determination and the Jones appraisal admitted defects and 
. . 
maccurac1es. 
REPLY POINT SEVEN 
THE JONES APPRAISAL WAS NOT 
COMPELLED BY "FEDERAL GUIDELINES" 
Compounding the problems with the Jones appraisal was an inherent 
misrepresentation about that appraisal. In the District Court and before this Court Safeco 
attempts to justify the low ball Jones appraisal because it was the product of "federal 
guidelines" as stated in the Declaration of Robert K. Jones. CR. 1015, 'IT 7 (2-9-15). 
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Safeco's brief herein, promotes the even stronger [mis]representation to Mr. 
Parks that the Jones appraisal was "strictly regulated by federal guidelines." 18 Safeco 
brief, p. 5. Not so. 
The Parks insuring agreement with Safeco was not a federal transaction; it 
was a private transaction between the Parks and Safeco' s agent in Pocatelio, Idaho. 
Neither Jones nor Safeco ever specified any applicable federal law or regulation that 
justified his lowball appraisal that downgraded the quality of this custom home, 
substantially shorted the Parks on their true square footage, and justified the use of two-
year old cost data. CR 776-801; Safeco Depo. 
It may well be that, in-house, or in some quarters - not here applicable 
there are customs or practices that touch upon the periphery of some federal regulation, 
possibly such as preparing an appraisal for a federal institution or federally-chartered 
lender. But, again, that was not this transaction. 
Misrepresentation of Appraisal for a Mortgage Refinance 
Appraiser Jones did, however, represent that his appraisal was for a 
mortgage lending purpose when it was not. 19 That typed-in misrepresentation is found in 
the "Additional Comments" section on the top part of page 5 of the Jones appraisal: 
The intended users are Safeco Insurance Co. and property 
18 This erroneous and unsubstantiated "strictly regulated by federal guidelines" contention was 
also argued by Safeco to the District Court. CR 843, line 7. 
19 There was no mortgage on the Parks' home. CR 228, David Parks Depo. 94:11-15. 
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owner. The intended use of this appraisal is [to] evaluate the 
subject of the appraisal for a mortgage refinance transaction. 
~ CR. 1020, ,r 7 ( 2-9-15). 
REPLY POINT EIGHT 
THE PARKS SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO AMEND 
TO PRESENT THEIR CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES TO A JURY 
Safeco argues that, as a matter of law, the Parks are not entitled to amend 
and present their claim for punitive damages to a jury. Safeco brief, p. 21. 
While a breach of the insuring agreement is a requirement of a claim of bad 
faith or for punitive damages, that was shown below and has been shown herein. 
Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance, 149 Idaho 299, 315, 233 
P.3d 1221, 1237 (2010). 
The "bottom line" is that a seasoned, respected insurance professional has 
carefully reviewed the conduct of Safeco and provided a detailed, 21-page Declaration 
setting forth his credentials and experience in 41 paragraphs and the detailed factual 
basis for why Safeco's conduct was outrageous. The bottom line was: 
42. For the reasons stated herein, it is my opinion, on an 
overall basis, that the Parks claim regarding for the total fire 
loss of their home on June 28, 2012 was from the outset, 
and on a continuing basis has been, seriously mishandled 
and that the conduct of the Defendant Safeco constitutes 
outrageous and extreme deviations from reasonable 
standards of conduct that Safeco owed its insured, the 
Parks. It is my further opinion that this conduct has 
evidenced an indifference to the impact upon the Parks 
as Safeco insureds and was with a conscious disregard 
for the likely consequences upon them. 
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF - Page 32 
David & Kristina Parks v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois 
43. It is my further opinion that the wrongful and indifferent 
claims handling conduct of Defendant Safeco towards the 
Parks as insureds of Safeco was an extreme breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and constituted 
bad faith. 
- CR 957, Declaration of Charles M. Miller, 11,r 42-43 (9-17-14) 
The Parks are entitled to present that evidence to a jury. 
REPLY POINT NINE 
THE PARKS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES 
PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE §41-1839(1); SAFECO 
IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES 
The Parks request this Court's award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1), on the basis that Safeco has not paid the amount justly due. It 
is beyond dispute that Safeco failed to honor all the policy provisions entitling the Parks 
to their "direct financial loss" and acted wrongfully in withholding payment and requiring 
the Parks to borrow money to pay their own loss before getting paid. 
It was wrongful for Safeco to contend the Parks were not entitled to 
payment "shortly following the loss" and forcing them into a smaller home for which they 
had to borrow money because Safeco was not honoring its insuring obligation. 
Safeco's conduct was contrary to the policy and outrageous; it essentially 
emasculated the meaning of "insurance" and receiving payment "shortly following the 
loss" for the Parks' home's insured value. 
Safeco's assertion of attorney fees on appeal claiming this case was 
"brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation" it itself 
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frivolous and "without foundation." It is unjustifiable to tell this Court in Safeco's 
briefing that the Parks "Direct financial loss" and right to payment "shortly following the 
loss" were not raised before the District Court when they were asserted pre-suit, brief, and 
orally argued. 
CONCLUSION 
Safeco did not honor its contractual fiduciary duties to the Parks. Its 
responsive brief on this appeal does not dispute that the District Court had the duty, in 
applying the policy provisions, to consider all policy provisions. The District Court did 
not do that. Safeco' s responsive briefs failing to make any substantive response to the 
Parks' contract right to (I) recover their "Direct financial loss" and (2) to be paid "shortly 
following the loss" shows the lack of merit in Safeco's position below and now. 
Safeco's brief says "The contract speaks for itself." Safeco Brief, p. 21. 
The Parks agree. It was error for the District Court to not follow the "Direct financial 
loss" provisions of the policy. It was inexcusably and grossly wrongful for Safeco to 
refuse payment "shortly following the loss" and to withhold payment forcing the Parks to 
borrow money for the very loss against which they bought the Safeco policy. 
Safeco's brief contention that these issues were not raised below has been 
shown herein to be totally without merit. Groundless. Why would Safeco so contend 
before this Court when the Deposition Exhibits, summary judgment filings, and oral 
argument transcripts clearly show otherwise? 
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This case should be reversed directing the District Court to enter judgment 
in favor of the Parks for their "Direct financial loss" as shown by the stipulated-as-
accurate replacement cost of the Belfor Property Restoration itemization. The remand 
should also entitle the Parks to amend and present their punitive damages claim to a jury. 
In the aitemative, at a minimum, this case should be remanded to ailow the 
jury to hear the evidence of what the Parks "Direct financial loss" was and to present to 
the jury its evidence of the outrageous conduct of Safeco. Decades of premiums paid to 
Safeco for a "Replacement Cost" homeowners insurance policy must stand for something 
more than being forced to borrow money to "pay your own loss" and only having the right 
to sue your insurer. 
"Thank you for trusting Safeco with your home insurance needs." 
CR 305; David Parks Depo. Ex. 2, POL 49. Hollow words. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of January, 2016 
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EXTRACT OF THE PARKS' NOVEMBER 22, 2013 ANSWER 
TO SAFECO'S INTERROGATORY NO. 6 
* * * 
SHOWING ASSERTION OF THE PARKS' RIGHT TO RECOVER 
"THEIR DIRECT FINANCIAL LOSS" 
UNDER THEIR SAFECO POLICY 
*** 
Referenced in the Parks' Reply Brief, p. 11 
Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852) 
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775) 
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1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Telephone: (208) 235-1600 
FAX: (208) 235-4200 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BANNOCK COUNTY, IDAHO 
The Honorable Stephen S. Dunn 
DAVID & KRISTINA PARKS, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SAFECO INSURANCE COMP ANY OF ) 
ILLINOIS, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CV-2013-2253-0C 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE 
TO DEFENDANT'S 
FIRST DISCOVERY 
INTERROGATORIES 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Please state your full name, and any other names or 
aliases you have used, your  and all  security numbers you have had. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Plaintiff David Parks was  
; Plaintiff Kristina Parks was  . Neither have 
used aliases. They will provide  Security numbers if a legitimate reason can be 
furnished for why such would be needed for this contract dispute. 
-INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Please state the name, address and telephone 
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to any of the issues involved in this action. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5: The statements of Defendant Safeco 
would be reflected in documents originating with Safeco. In addition, Defendant's agent, 
Lucy Abendschein, advised Plaintiffs' counsel in a telephone conversation that Safeco 
would pay the addition money representing the difference between what has been paid for 
their home and their full policy limits if the Plaintiffs would build onto their current 
house in Idaho Falls even though Plaintiffs do not desire to do that. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Please set forth in detail a full and complete 
itemization of all damages alleged and sought by you in this action. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Plaintiffs seek their "Direct 
Financial Loss" as set forth in the Safeco policy. That amount is the difference between 
what Safeco has paid for their home and the $409,090 of coverage, being less than the 
$440,195.55 determined by Belfor Property Restoration as the Plaintiffs' loss that Safeco 
agreed to be bound by as the cost to replace the Plaintiffs' home the "Direct Financial 
Loss" and "actual cash value" of the total structure/dwelling loss. In addition the 
Plaintiffs seek statutory 12% APR interest pursuant to Idaho Code §28-22-104 on that 
difference, the interest that Plaintiffs are being required to pay on their Idaho Falls new 
home loan, costs incurred in this litigation, and attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
§41-1839. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: For each and all of the damages alleged above in 
your Answer to Interrogatory No. 6, please set forth the facts supporting your claim to 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S FIR.ST DISCOVERY - Page 4 
Parks v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois 
REQUEST NO. 32: Any and all documents or things related to or pertaining to 
your Answer to Interrogatory No. 26, or relied upon you in preparing your Answer to 
Interrogatory No. 26. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 32: This is the policy Declarations information 
that Defendant Safeco furnished. 
REQUEST NO. 33: Any and all documents or things you relied upon in 
preparing your Answer to Interrogatory No. 27, or which were identified therein. 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST NO. 33: There are none except as came from 
Defendant with the discovery requests. 
DATED this 22nd day of November, 2013 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
c;;~ ~a L-----LLN. HAWKES 
VERIFICATION 
As counsel for the Plaintiffs herein, and being more fully informed on a 
total basis as to the subject matter and contentions of this discovery, I verify that the 
foregoing are true and correct based on the infonnation currently known and available. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of November, 2013 I mailed a copy of 
the foregoing to Robert A. Anderson of Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, 250 South Fifth 
Street, Suite 700, Boise, ID 83707-7426; FAX 208-344-5510. 
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EXTRACT OF THE PARKS' SEPTEMBER 3, 2013 RESPONSE 
TO SAFECO'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 21 
* * * 
SHOWING ASSERTION OF THE PARKS' RIGHT TO RECOVER 
"THEIR DIRECT FINANCIAL LOSS" 
UNDER THEIR SAFECO POLICY 
* * * 
Referenced in the Parks' Reply Brief, p. 11 
Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852) 
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775) 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BANNOCK COUNTY, IDAHO 
The Honorable Stephen S. Dunn 
DAVID & KRlSTINA PARKS, ) 
) 
Plaintijfe, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF ) 
ILLINOIS, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CV-2013-2253-0C 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE 
TO DEFENDANT'S 
FIRST REQUESTS 
FOR ADMISSION 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Please admit that Exhibit A, attached 
hereto, is a true and correct copy of the July 21, 2012, Appraisal Report prepared by 
Robert K. Jones. 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO. 1: Denied. No Exhibit A was attached; there were no 
attachments to this discovery. Plaintiffs have seen an appraisal but have never seen the 
original so could not admit whether any copy is a true and correct copy of the original. 
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in Idaho Falls. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 19: Please admit that the total consideration 
paid by Plaintiffs for the Idaho Falls, Idaho, house was $300,000. 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO. 19: Admitted. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 20: Please admit that the total consideration 
paid by Plaintiffs for the Idaho Falls, Idaho, replacement house was less than 
$440,195.55. 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO. 20: Admitted. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 21: Please admit that as to replacement cost, 
the policy (paragraph 5.a, p. 12) provides "We will pay the full cost of repair or 
replacement, but not exceeding the smallest of the following amounts .... " 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO. 21: Admitted that is a portion of the policy. 
Plaintiffs' claim is based on the provisions thereafter allowing recovery for their "direct 
financial loss" as set forth in 5 (a)( 4)(b) on page 12. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 22: Please admit that the smallest of the 
"following amounts" listed in the policy at paragraph 5.a, p. 12, was the $300,000 spent 
by the Parks to "replace the damaged building." 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO. 22: Denied as not relevant to the Parks claim. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 23: Please admit that this suit was not well 
grounded in fact. 
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RESPONSE TO RFA NO. 23: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 24: Please admit that this suit was not 
warranted by existing law. 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO. 24: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 25: Please admit that this suit was not 
warranted by a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law. 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO. 25: Denied. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 26: Please admit that Plaintiffs' suit in this 
matter is frivolous. 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO. 26: Denied. 
DATED this 3rd day of September, 2013 
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LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of September, 2013 I faxed a copy of the 
foregoing to Robert A. Anderson of Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, 250 South Fifth 
Street, Suite 700, Boise, ID 83707-7426; FAX 208-344-5510. 
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The Honorable Stephen S. Dwm 
DA VJD & KR1811NA PAR.KS, } 
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ILLINOIS, ) 
) 
Def~dant. ) 
Case No. CV-2013-2253-0C 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE 
TO DEFENDANT'S 
FIRST REQUESTS 
FOR ADMISSION 
'REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
RF,&UEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 1: Plcru,o admit that Exhibit A, attached 
hereto, is a true andcom:ct copy ofilic July 21, 2012,A.PPraisal Reportpropared lrf 
Robert K. Jones. 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO. I: Denied. No Exhibit Awns attached; 1here were no 
attachments to this, discovery. Plaintiffs have seen an appraisal but have never seen tltc 
original so could not admit whether any copy is a true and correct copy otthe original. 
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EXTRACT OF THE PARKS' OCTOBER 22, 2013 RESPONSE 
TO SAFECO'S REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 40 
* * * 
SHOWING ASSERTION OF THE PARKS' RIGHT TO RECOVER 
"THEIR DIRECT FINANCIAL LOSS" 
UNDER THEIR SAFECO POLICY 
* * * 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BANNOCK COUNTY, IDAHO 
The Honorable Stephen S. Dunn 
DAVID & KRISTINA PARKS, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY OF ) 
ILLINOIS, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
Case No. CV-2013-2253-0C 
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSES 
TO DEFENDANT'S 
SECOND REQUESTS FOR 
ADMISSION 
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 27: Please admit that Exhibit A, 
attached hereto, is a true and correct copy of the July 21, 2012, Appraisal Report prepared 
by Robert K. Jones. 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO. 27: Denied. Plaintiffs cannot admit to this 
document being "a true and correct copy" as the purported original has never been made 
available to them under authenticating circumstances. 
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RESPONSE TO RFA NO. 38: Plaintiffs can neither admit nor deny this 
Request as it is unclear what is specifically being requested and what "the estimate in 
Exhibit C" refers to among the 5 86+ items enumerated in the pages with footer numbers 
"Page: 3" through "Page: 29". If this Request as asking Plaintiffs to admit that the Belfor 
Property Restoration sets forth amounts that by their total both Plaintiffs and their insurer 
were willing to be bound by as the Direct Financial Loss to the Parks as computed by the 
estimated values set forth in the Belfor document then that is admitted. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 39: Please admit that Plaintiffs have 
never contested the estimate given in Exhibit C. 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO. 39: Plaintiffs can neither admit nor deny this 
for the reasons set forth in the Response to Request No. 38 above: 
Plaintiffs can neither admit nor deny this Request as it is 
unclear what is specifically being requested and what "the 
estimate in Exhibit C" refers to among the 586+ items 
enumerated in the pages with footer numbers "Page: 3" 
through "Page: 29". If this Request as asking Plaintiffs to 
admit that the Belfor Property Restoration sets forth amounts 
that by their total both Plaintiffs and their insurer were willing 
to be bound by as the Direct Financial Loss to the Parks as 
computed by the estimated values set forth in the Belfor 
document then that is admitted. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 40: Please admit that the estimate in 
Exhibit C represents the amount to repair or reconstruct the dwelling. 
RESPONSE TO RFA NO. 40: Denied as to "repair" as the home was nor 
repairable but was a total loss. Admitted that Safeco agreed the Parks' policy with 
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Safeco insured their home in the amount of the replacement cost as representing what the 
loss to the Parks was; denied if it is contended the amount they were entitled to could be 
reduced by Safeco to an amount less than their Direct Financial Loss as measured by the 
cost of replacing what they had lost as set forth in the Belfor document. See paragraphs 
15 through 19 of the Complaint And Jury Demand. 
DATED this 2211d day of October, 2013 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 2211d day of October, 2013 I faxed a copy of the 
foregoing to Robert A. Anderson of Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP, 250 South Fifth 
Street, Suite 700, Boise, ID 83707-7426; FAX 208-344-5510. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3 pt day of January, 2016 I mailed two copies of 
the foregoing to Robert A. Anderson and Mark D. Sebastian of Anderson, Julian & Hull, 
LLP, 250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700, Boise, ID 83707-7426; FAX 208-344-5510. 
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